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Abstract. The  premise  of automated alert correlation is to accept that 
false alerts from a low level intrusion detection system are inevitable and 
use attack models to explain  the output in an understandable way. Sev- 
eral algorithms exist for this purpose which use attack graphs  to model 
the ways  in  which  attacks  can  be  combined.  These  algorithms  can  be 
classified in to two broad  categories namely  scenario-graph approaches, 
which  create  an  attack model  starting from  a vulnerability  assessment 
and type-graph approaches which rely on an abstract model of the rela- 
tions between attack types. Some research in to improving the efficiency 
of type-graph correlation has been  carried  out but this research has ig- 
nored  the hypothesizing of missing alerts. Our work is to present a novel 
type-graph algorithm which unifies correlation and hypothesizing in to a 
single operation. Our experimental results indicate that the approach is 
extremely  efficient  in the face of intensive alerts and  produces compact 
output graphs  comparable to other  techniques. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The  output of intrusion detection systems (IDS)  is generally  a time series of 
discrete events called “alerts” with each event describing,  at a low level, features 
of the network traffic. These alert attributes typically include the endpoints and 
communication channels  implicated in an alert and  the type of alert. Arguably 
the most  significant  problem  with  analyzing  IDS alerts  is the high  volume  of 
false alarms.  Even without false alarms  IDS alerts require  some interpretation. 
This  is because  attacks are often split in to several  stages, each of which may 
generate many  alerts. 
This  observation has lead to the proposal  that alerts be automatically cor- 
related using  a model  of attacks which  encodes  their prerequisites and  conse- 
quences [10]. Typically  these methods  involve representing attack types as ver- 
tices in a directed  acyclic graph  which we shall call an “attack graph”.  Edges in 
attack graphs represent the relationship between prerequisites and consequences 
of attacks. Intuitively speaking,  a directed  edge will connect  attack A to attack 
B if A prepares  for B. 
Research  has shown that such techniques are capable  of: 
 
1.  Aggregating alerts which imply the same, or similar,  consequences.  An ag- 
gregated group of alerts is called a hyper-alert. 
  
 
 
2.  Ignoring  extraneous alerts which do not correlate with anything. 
3.  Uncovering  missing  alerts in  an  alert stream and  hypothesizing their at- 
tribute values  where possible [8]. Hypotheses may  optionally  be compared 
against other evidence sources such as system logs [11]. 
 
These automated alert correlation techniques may be divided  in to two cat- 
egories based on the type of attack model which is encoded in the attack graph. 
We shall refer to the two categories as type-graph and scenario-graph algorithms. 
Scenario  graph  algorithms rely on a complete  and  correct  vulnerability assess- 
ment to generate a graph of attack sequences specific to the protected network[6]. 
While  this approach   allows  for  real-time  automated correlation it fails  com- 
pletely  if network  addresses  are re-assigned  or if the vulnerability assessment is 
erroneous.  Conversely,  type graph  algorithms model only abstract attack types 
which allows for more robust correlation but  with a higher computational cost. 
In [10] correlation is performed  in batch mode only and  in [15], where vulnera- 
bility assessment data is incorporated, a sliding correlation window is required 
to keep the problem  manageable. 
We assert that real-time  correlation is desirable  because it allows for timely 
automated responses. If the time lag between detection and response is too great 
then attacks such as rapidly  spreading  worms may become much more difficult 
to contain. Real-time  operation also facilitates techniques such as [4] where cor- 
relation output is used to perform a targeted forensic analysis of network  traffic 
for the purposes of discovering  novel attacks and variations of known attacks. 
Our work is motivated by the need for a correlation algorithm with both the 
flexibility of an abstract attack type-graph and similar performance  characteris- 
tics to state of the art scenario graph  algorithms. Specifically, we wish to avoid 
relying on prior knowledge of network  topology and the distribution of vulnera- 
bilities in the protected network.  It is also desirable to avoid relying on a sliding 
correlation window which would allow “low and slow” attacks to become lost. 
The aim of this paper  is to develop an automated alert correlation algorithm 
using attack type graphs  which is suitable for deployment in a real-time  setting. 
A theoretical analysis  of computational complexity will be provided.  For verifi- 
cation  the algorithm  will be experimentally  evaluated  in terms  of performance 
and accuracy. 
Our  proposed  solution  works  by  re-structuring the type graph  correlation 
algorithm presented by Ning et al. such that it acts  on individual  alerts in se- 
quence rather than all alerts in batch. The basic approach  is to keep an internal 
database  of hyper-alerts  of each type  and  use in-memory  indexes to efficiently 
find prerequisites of each new hyper-alert. The  size of the in-memory  database 
is minimized  by eliminating  redundant  information  which does not contribute 
to the correlation process. Hypothesizing of missing alerts is a recursive special- 
case of the correlation algorithm which  can  input  hyper-alerts with wild-card 
attributes. The  main  contributions of this work  are  a  type-graph correlation 
algorithm suitable for real-time  use. The  algorithm depends  on a novel index 
structure and unifies the correlation and hypothesising steps in to a single algo- 
rithm. 
  
 
 
This paper  is structured as follows. First a brief discussion of related work is 
given in section  2. From here we present a description and  formal definition of 
the problem  in section  3. Building  on this definition, a solution  is presented in 
section 4 which solves the minimal IAC problem where there are no false negative 
alerts. This minimal  algorithm is developed to the fuller solution  presented and 
analyzed  in section 5. Section 6 provides an empirical  analysis of the algorithm. 
In the final section the results are discussed, conclusions drawn  and future  work 
proposed. 
 
 
2 Related Work 
 
 
Seminal  works  such  as [5, 13] laid  the groundwork  for automated analysis  of 
security related facts and events. These works proposed  a formal theory of com- 
puter  attacks by modeling the prerequisites and consequences of vulnerabilities 
in attack graphs  and formal grammars respectively. 
Wang  et al. take a vulnerability-centric approach  to alert correlation [6]. In 
this work an automated vulnerability analysis  [12, 14] creates an attack graph 
consisting of two types of vertex, attacks and  states. Only those attacks which 
have been found  on the protected system are included.  All attack vertices are 
bound  with attribute values  such  as  IP  addresses  and  ports. The  correlation 
algorithm works by performing  a breadth first search on the attack graph.  High 
performance  is achieved  by enumerating all possible fact assignments for every 
attack type and  pre-computing an  optimized  graph  structure for correlation. 
Another important concept  in this work is “implicit correlation” whereby only 
the latest alert which satisfies an attack step is stored in memory.  However, we 
have  asserted  that it  is undesirable  to assume  that the defender  can  reliably 
know of all vulnerabilities on the network.  Therefore  our work uses an abstract 
attack-type model although we do use a similar hypothesizing technique and try 
to preserve  the notion of implicit correlation as far as possible. 
Ning et al. take a logical approach  to modeling  attack sequences  for auto- 
mated correlation[2, 9, 10]. The technique is intended to be applied  in batch to 
an off-line database of collected hyper-alerts. The fundamental building block of 
the approach  is the definition  of a “hyper-alert  type”  which represents  a type 
of attack and its prerequisites and consequences. Each hyper-alert type consists 
of a triple of fact  names  and  prerequisites and  conclusions  which are predicate 
expressions  with  free variables  bound  from the fact  names.  If a predicate  ap- 
pears in the consequence of one hyper-alert type and the prerequisite of another 
then the former  “may  prepare  for” the latter. The  assignment  of facts  to any 
such shared predicate are used to calculate equality constraints between the two 
types. 
A hyper-alert of a given type is simply a tuple of attribute values correspond- 
ing to the fact names for that type. Correlation is performed  in batch on a set of 
hyper-alerts, each hyper-alert is considered  a potential vertex in the correlation 
graph  and  if equality constraints are satisified between  other hyper-alerts then 
  
 
 
they are correlated by adding a directed  edge between them provided  that their 
timestamps show the correct  temporal order. 
Hypothesizing of missing alerts is treated in [8, 11]. The problem here is that 
when some steps in an attack have been missed by the underlying  IDS then the 
resultant correlation  graphs  may  be split  and  require  additional  processing  to 
re-integrate them. The approach  taken in their work involves four steps: 
 
1.  Subgraphs  of the correlation graph  are clustered according  to the attribute 
values of their hyper  alerts. 
2.  Once candidate subgraphs  have been selected for integration, a special hyper- 
alert type-graph  is  consulted  which  has  had  indirect   edges  added  to it. 
Pairs  of subgraphs  are then correlated using these new edges to define the 
indirectly-prepares-for relation. 
3.  When an indirect  correlation occurs there are one or more paths in the type- 
graph  connecting  the two hyper-alert types. New hyper-alerts are created to 
connect  the two correlation graphs  and their attribute values inferred using 
the equality constraints in the graph. 
4.  Because  the prior  steps  may  generate  many  redundant  hypotheses  with 
equivalent fact values, a consolidation step reduces the size of the final cor- 
relation graph. 
 
The work presented in this paper takes a different approach  and simply relies 
on recursing  backwards  through the type-graph whenever a hyper-alert is input 
which has not had  it’s prerequisites met  by another  hyper-alert in the system. 
Our method  is at once more efficient and  eliminates the consolidation step by 
terminating recursion  as soon as a duplicate hypothesis is generated. 
In  [15]  correlation and  hypothesizing is performed,  again,  in  batch mode. 
However in this case a state/event model is chosen so that evidence from com- 
plementary  sources  such as vulnerability  analysis  and  raw  audit logs. The  at- 
tack model is converted in to a Bayesian  network  where prior  probabilities are 
assigned  manually  by  human  experts. A sliding  time window is used  to limit 
memory  usage  and  prevent a  combinatorial explosion  in run-time  complexity 
associated with the Bayesian  inference algorithm. 
Our  work  is most similar  to [7]  in  which  in-memory  indexes  are  used  to 
significantly speed up correlation leaving the RDBMS just to store a log of hyper- 
alerts on disk. The  most relevant contribution in their work is the proposal  to 
index  instances  of predicates  rather than hyper  alerts.  Their  results  indicate 
that the algorithm would be suitable for real-time  operation but  hypothesizing 
of missing alerts is not addressed  and must presumably be performed  as a post- 
processing step on the correlation graph.  The work presented in this paper takes 
a different approach  and instead indexes instances of the P repareF or relation. 
In summary, there are several automated correlation algorithms. Those which 
are  suitable for real-time  operation either rely  on  the defender  being  able  to 
correctly  and  completely  enumerate possible  combinations of attacks on their 
protected network,  or worse, rely on a sliding time window which opens up the 
correlator to “low and slow” or “alert injection”  attacks. The abstract type-graph 
  
 
 
approach  appears  more promising  and  has been partly optimized  for real-time 
deployment. Our  work  builds  on  prior  techniques by  using  a  novel  indexing 
structure and  unifying  the correlation  and  hypothesizing  steps  in  to a  single 
real-time  algorithm. 
 
 
3 Problem Definition 
 
For  the purposes  of clarity  the intrusion  alert correlation  (IAC)  problem  will 
be solved in two steps. Firstly the “minimal  IAC  problem”  in which a totally 
accurate alert stream is input  and no alerts are hypothesized and secondly; the 
“extended  IAC problem”  in which some alerts  can be missing and  the system 
must hypothesize alerts. The following problem  definition is based on that pro- 
posed by Ning et al.[8–11]. 
 
Definition 1. An attack  model consists  of logical predicates, hyper-alert  types 
and implication  relations. A hyper-alert type T is a triple (f act, prerequisite, 
consequence) where f act  is a  set  of attribute names  associated  with the  type, 
prerequisite and  consequence  are  sets  of predicate  expressions  with free  vari- 
ables bound from  f act.  P rereq(T ) and  C onseq(T ) denote  the  set  of predicate 
expressions  from  the  prerequisite and  consequence  elements  of T  respectively. 
For  brevity we assume  all implied expressions  to be included in C onseq(T ). We 
shall refer  to the set of all hyper-alert  types in an attack  model as τ . 
 
For the purpose of our examples we will assume that there are always 4 ele- 
ments in f act (say, source address,  source port, destination address,  destination 
port). 
 
Definition 2. Given  an  ordered  pair  of hyper-alert  types (A, B)  then  A may 
prepare for B  if C onseq(A)  and P rereq(B) share  at least one predicate, with 
possibly different  arguments. 
 
Definition 3. Given an  ordered  pair  of hyper-alert  types (A, B)  where A may 
prepare  for B a set of equality constraints may be computed.  Each  such con- 
straint is a  set  of logical conjunctions of equality  comparisons between the  at- 
tributes  of the two types. 
Let  the  sequences  u1 , u2 , ..., un   and  v1 , v2 , ..., vn   be distinct  facts  in  type  A 
and B respectively.  Then  each constraint takes the form: 
 
u1   = v1  ∧ u2   = v2  ∧ ... ∧ un  = 
vn 
such  that  there  exists  p(u1 , u2 , ...un )  ∈  C onseq(A)   and  p(v1 , v2 , ..., vn )  ∈ 
P rereq(B) where p is the same predicate  with possibly different fact assignments. 
 
 
Note that the only substantial difference between our definition and  that of 
Ning et al. is the restriction that any given fact may appear  at most once in the 
arguments  of a predicate.  The  purpose  of this  restriction  will become clear  in 
the following sections. 
  
 
 
Definition 4. Given an attack model, let us define an attack-type graph T G = 
(V, E, C, T ). Where (V, E) is a directed  acyclic graph. T is a bijection of vertices 
on to hyper-alert  types. An edge e(v0 , v1 ) ∈ E  if and only if T (v0 ) may prepare 
for T (v1 ). C maps each edge to a set of constraints. 
 
Definition 5. A hyper-alert h is simply a tuple of attribute values.  T ype(h) 
is a mapping  on to the set of hyper-alert  types.  P rereq(h)  and  C onseq(h)  de- 
note  the  set  of predicates  from  the  prerequisite and  consequence  of the  hyper- 
alert  type with free variables  bound from the attribute values of the hyper-alert. 
T imestamp(h) denotes the timestamp  of the hyper-alert. A hyper-alert stream 
is any time-ordered series  of hyper-alerts. 
 
Definition 6. A hyper-alert  h of type A is said  to prepare for a hyper-alert 
h′   of type B  if and  only if T ype(h)  may prepare  for T ype(h′ ) and  at  least  one 
equality constraint evaluates  to true  when fact names  have been substituted  with 
actual  values from  the hyper  alerts.  Furthermore, since  an  event  B  can  be the 
cause of an event C if and only if B occurs before C , an implicit time constraint 
ensures  forward  causality  holds. In  other  words the  directed  edges in  T G,  like 
time,  move from past to future. 
 
Two hyper  alerts are said to be correlated if and only if the former prepares 
for the latter. Since all that is required  to correlate two hyper  alerts is that any 
one of the constraints holds. We might say that each edge in T G is labeled with a 
predicate logical formula, consisting only of equality comparisons,  in disjunctive 
normal  form. 
 
Definition 7. The output  correlation  graph C G is (V, E, H ) where (V, E)  is 
a DAG and H  is a bijection of hyper-alerts to vertices and an edge e(v0 , v1 ) ∈ E 
if and only if H (v0 ) prepares  for H (v1 ). 
 
Definition 8. If a hyper-alert  h exists where P rereq(h) is non-empty  and there 
does not  exist a hyper-alert  h′   such that  h′   prepares  for h then  h is said  to  
be “unexplained”. 
An unexplained alert h may sometimes  be explained by the construction of 
a sequence of hypothesized hyper alerts  y1 , y2 , ..., yn  such that  yn  prepares  for 
h, yn−1  prepares  for yn , ...,  and a real (unhypothesised) hyper alert  h
′  prepares 
for y1 . There  may be several alternative explanations  for any such hyper-alert. 
The extended correlation graph EG therefore  consists of (V, E, H, Y ) with 
the same  definition  as C G with the addition  of Y , a mapping  of vertices  on to 
the set of hypothesised hyper-alerts which are required  to explain any unexplained 
alerts  in H . V  is formed by the union  of H  and Y . 
 
In summary  our problem  is to propose an algorithm which: 
 
1.  Is initialized with TG,  and an empty  CG. 
2.  At each time step: 
(a)  Input  a hyper-alert. 
(b)  Construct  a  correct  and  complete  CG  as  per  definition  7 or,  for the 
extended IAC problem,  definition 8. 
 
 
 
4 A  Minimal Solution 
 
 
The inner loop of our proposed  algorithm consists of two steps. Firstly “search- 
ing for correlations” and  secondly  “marking  of consequences”.  When  marking 
consequences  of a type  T hyper-alert  h we find each type  T ′  such that T may 
prepare  for T ′ . Then  the equality  constraints  between  the two  types  are  used 
so as to index every possible combination of hyper-alert attributes for T ′  which 
should  be considered  prepared for by h. Each  index entry created in this stage 
contains a pointer to h. Conversely  when searching  for correlations the indexes 
on type T are searched  using the attributes of h. If an earlier hyper-alert h′  has 
been input  and  marked  it’s consequences  it will be found during  the searching 
for correlations stage if and only if h′  prepares  for h. The structure of our index 
is unique and, by indexing each attribute combination separately, the IAC is re- 
duced to a sufficiently small constant number of search and insert operations on 
balanced  binary  trees[1] rather than multi-dimensional searches with wild-cards. 
This approach  exploits two properties of the structure of the problem. Firstly 
that time  flows from past to future,  meaning  that prior  alerts  do not need  to 
be checked and correlated twice. Secondly although the number  of possible con- 
straints on  a  given edge are  exponentially related to the number  of facts,  in 
practice,  the number  of facts  and  therefore the maximum  number  of indexes 
required  is small. 
 
 
Lemma 1. Given a pair of hyper-alert  types (T0 , T1 ) we take A and B to be their 
attribute sets. The sets of attributes are  equipotent,  each containing n elements. 
Each  constraint may be represented as a set containing 0 <= m <= n ordered 
pairs of attributes (a, b) such that a ∈ A and b ∈ B. No element of A may appear 
as a left component  more than once, and no element of B may appear  as a right 
component  more than  once since by definition  3 the problem is restricted to the 
simplified case in which each fact referred  to in an equality constraint may make 
at most one appearance on each side of the equation. 
There  are P (n, m) C (n, m) ways to arrange  m distinct  pairs from n elements 
of A and n elements  of B, where P  and C are  the permute  and chose functions 
respectively.  The number  of possible equality constraints is therefore  the sum of 
all constraints of each length m. 
 
 
Proof.  Our problem  is to construct two sequences a1 , a2 , ..., am  and b1 , b2 , ..., bm 
where a1   is paired  with b1 , a2   is paired  with b2 , etc. We shall solve the 
problem in two separate steps. First we chose m elements of A and m elements 
of B and secondly we arrange  the pairs. There  are C (n, m)2    ways to select a 
pair (A′ , B′ ) where A′  ∈ the set of all m-combinations of elements in A and  B′  
∈ the set of all m-combinations of elements in B. Now to pair them up we keep 
elements of A′  in a fixed order  and  simply  count  the ways to permute  the  
elements  of B′ . Since there are m! ways to permute m attributes: 
 
 
 
 
 
C (n, m)2    m! = 
n! 
m!(n − m)! 
n! 
 
n! 
m!(n − m)! 
n! 
 
 m! 
= 
m!(n − m)! 
  
(n − m)! 
= C (n, m)  P (n, m)  ⊓⊔ 
 
If we wish to count the maximum  number  of constraints when there is more 
than one type  of attribute then we can re-use the formula  above  to count  the 
ways of comparing  the attributes of each type and take the product: 
 
t ci Y X 
P (ci , j)  C (ci , j) (1) 
i=1 j=0 
 
Where  t is the number  of types,  ci   is the number  of attributes of the i
th 
type. Therefore,  if we chose 4 facts: source and destination addresses  and ports 
where addresses  and  ports are not comparable  with each other. Then  there are 
49 possible constraints to an edge in T G. Since there are less combinations than 
permutations, the idea is to create an index for each of the 16 combinations of 
facts for each type. Permutations capture the possibly different orderings for the 
attributes in the equality  constraints  and  will be used when inserting  items  in 
to the indexes. 
Algorithm  1, requires  several further  definitions  to determine which combi- 
nations of fields must be indexed for each type and how to evaluate what are the 
consequences  for each hyper-alert  so that they  can be marked.  A notion  simi- 
lar to implicit correlation in [6] is introduced. If two hyper-alerts have identical 
attribute values then they must also have identical consequences  meaning  that 
the correlation procedure  is redundant the second  time around.  We define an 
implict  correlation so that all hyper-alerts of a given type are indexed based on 
the combination of fact values which are used in marking  of consequences. 
 
Definition 9. The CorrelationSet is a relation on a given pair of types (T, T′), 
such that CorrelationSet(T, T′) is a set of pairs of the form (a, b) where a is 
a permutation of facts in T and b is an subset of facts in T′ such that a and b 
are eqipotent and there exists an equality constraint of the form u1 = v1 ∧ u2 = 
v2 ∧ ...un = vn where sequence u1, u2, ..., un is the elements of a arranged in to 
a fixed order and v1, v2, ..., vn is the sequence b. 
Definition 10. The  Index Set is a relation  on a given type T  and  set of all 
types τ which returns subsets of facts in T which must be indexed. I ndexSet(T , τ ) 
returns every subset  x of facts  of T  where there  exists  a T ′  such that  T ′   may 
prepare  for T and x is a right-component of C orrelationSet(T ′ , T ). 
 
Definition 11. The  Implicit Set is a relation  on a given type T  and  set  of 
all types τ which returns a set of facts in T upon which future  correlations may 
depend. I mplicitSet(T , τ ) returns the union of every subset x of facts in T where 
 
 
 
 
 
there exists a T ′ such that T may prepare  for T ′ and x is a left-component  in an 
element  of C orrelationSet(T , T ′ ). 
 
Input: Hyper alert stream H , Hyper-alert types τ 
Output: All pairs (h′ , h) such that h′  prepares  for h and both are in H 
foreach h ∈ H  (input  in ascending  time order)  do 
Let T = T ype(h); 
Let i be a index on I mplicitSet(T , τ ); 
if Lookup(i,  h)  then 
Continue with next alert; 
end 
foreach index i on I ndexSet(T , τ ) do 
Let the set of hyper-alerts R = Lookup(i,  h); 
foreach h′  ∈ R do 
Add the pair (h′ , h) to Output; 
end 
end 
foreach Type T ′  where T may prepare  for T ′  do 
foreach Permutation p, index i on CorrelationSet(T , T ′ ) do 
Insert(i, Permute(h, p)); 
end 
end 
end 
Algorithm 1: The minimal  ATG  algorithm 
 
 
5 Hypothesising  Missing Alerts 
 
Algorithm 1 does not attempt to deal  with missing  alerts in  the input  alert 
stream. What should  happen  is that for any  alert which arrives  and  is not ex- 
plained  by a prior alert then those alerts are hypothesized with appropriate fact 
values. This is done recursively until either a hyper-alert type with in-degree zero 
is found, no facts can be inferred  for a hypothesis or until a real alert is found. 
Only if a real alert is found will the hypothesized sequence be entered in to the 
correlation graph.  If no results are found in the “search  for correlations” stage 
then the current alert is unexplained.  Alerts are  hypothesized with attributes 
satisfying each constraint on each incoming  edge. Often times only a subset  of 
the fact values may be inferred for a hypothesized alert as not all values have to 
be referred  to in the equality constraints from the attack model. 
This leads to a problem  when we recurse more than one step. The recursion 
needs to terminate when a real hyper-alert may prepare  for a hypothesized one. 
There  is no guarantee that an index  exists for the subset  of fact  values  in the 
hypothesized alert. Our approach  leads us to consider the hypothesizing problem 
as identical to the correlation problem, except that our hyper-alerts may contain 
a partial set of attribute values. 
A  pre-processing  step  is introduced  in  which  an  expanded   version  of the 
I ndexSet is calculated so that all such partial sets of attribute values are indexed. 
  
 
 
Also we intrdouce the relation H ypothesisSet(T , τ ) where T is a type and  τ is 
the set of all hyper-alert types. This relations maps on to a set of 5-tuples  with 
the components (t, i, p, m, o): 
 
1.  t is a type which may prepare  for T . 
2.  i is an element of the I ndexSet of t. 
3.  p is a permutation to apply to fact values of the current hyper-alert in order 
to query the index i of type t. 
4.  m is the combination of facts which appear  in p. 
5.  o is the combination of facts  that were originally  required  for the current 
constraint. In other words all facts mentioned on the right hand  side of the 
equality comparisons  for this constraint. 
 
The hypothesizing algorithm then is a recursive  procedure  with two param- 
eters the first of which is a T G vertex v′  and the second is a hyper-alert h. The 
function returns true  if a real hyper-alert was correlated or false otherwise. The 
procedure  is that for each element in the H ypothesisSet associated with v′ : 
 
1.  Let  f be the set of hypothesized  fact  attributes in h. Continue  the loop if 
the union of f and o is not equal to m. This avoids generating unnecessary 
hypotheses based on a strict subset  of the actually  available  fact attributes. 
2.  Let h′  be a new hyper-alert. Use p to permute the facts in h and assign them 
to h′ . 
3.  Create a key from h′  which combines facts required  for index i of t. Query i 
and if a result is found, correlate the result with h′  and continue the loop. 
4.  Recurse to the vertex for type t passing hyper-alert h′ . If the recursion returns 
true then correlate h′  with h. 
 
With this procedure  hyper-alerts with identical attributes may be created in 
order to satisfy different paths through the attack graph  even though they may 
eventually lead to the same place. Such alerts add  nothing to the intelligibility 
of the result since one real alert could conceivably  account for all such identical 
hypotheses. 
We define two  hyper-alerts  as strategically  indistinguishable  provided  that 
they  are  of the same  type,  have  the same  combination  of facts  assigned  with 
the same values and appear  before the hyper-alert they have been hypothesized 
to explain.  Similarly  to the implicit correlation step described  in the previous 
section a hypothesized alert database is added  to each vertex in the type-graph. 
 
 
6 Empirical Results 
 
To  verify  the theory the algorithm is implemented in C[3]. Trivial  sub-graph 
elimination is implemented by keeping count of vertex degress in C G as edges are 
added, only vertices with degree greater than zero are output. This small addition 
makes  output graphs  more  manageable. The  Lincoln  Labs  1.0 dataset is used 
in the experiments  for the purposes  of generating  results  comparable  to prior 
  
 
 
works. These  data-sets  include  labeling  data which allows for the construction 
of a perfectly  accurate series of alerts. An attack model almost identical to that 
in [11] is used. The  only difference is in fixing an error  in the original in which 
UDP port-scans could be said to discover TCP  services and vice versa, which is 
not the case. All experiments were run  on a PC  with 1.6GHz Intel Core 2 Duo 
CPU  and 1GB RAM running  a contemporary Linux distribution. 
Two experiments are proposed:  experiment #1 is designed to verify that the 
algorithm is suitable for application in a real-time correlation setting as intended. 
Experiment #2 is designed  to qualitatively assess the hypothesizing algorithm 
when  a  random  subset  of relevant alerts have  been  deleted  from  a  perfectly 
accurate alert stream. 
 
 
6.1 Performance 
 
The  aim of this  experiment  is to test the suitability  of our algorithm  for real- 
time correlation. The method  is to intersperse a true scenario consisting of 855 
alerts  within  a large number  of randomly  generated  alerts  such that there  are 
1,000,000 alerts in total. No direct  comparison  with prior  work is possible here 
since comparable  algorithms  are  either  not intended  for real-time  setting,  do 
not perform the hypothesizing step or use a different attack model. Instead, the 
time  taken  for the software  to perform  the work will be recorded  and  divided 
by  the number  of alerts which  will give us a correlation-rate. As long as the 
correlation-rate is higher than the rate at which we expect alerts to be produced 
by  the underlying  IDS  then the algorithm ought to be  suitable for real-time 
operation. The  size of the output graphs  is also recorded  representing the bulk 
of the memory  utilization of the program. 
There  are  several  parameters in  this experiment. Firstly we will run  the 
experiment  with  variations  of the algorithm  so that we can get an idea of the 
costs and benefits of each. 
 
1.  Algorithm 1. Minimal IAC problem. 
(a)  With implicit correlations disabled. 
(b)  With implicit correlations enabled. 
2.  Algorithm 2. Extended IAC problem. 
(a)  Without consolidating strategically indistinguishable hypotheses. 
(b)  Strategically indistinguishable hypotheses consolidated. 
 
The  question arises of how precisely to generate a large number  of random- 
ized false positive  alerts.  The  attribute space is 96 bits  in total, based  on two 
32 bit IP  addresses,  and  two 16 bit port numbers.  If all attributes are  totally 
randomized  the probability of false correlations being generated is exceedingly 
small. Conversely  if we devise a non-random worst-case data-set in which false 
alarms  are crafted specifically to generate correlations then we are venturing in 
to the area  of specific attacks aimed  at the correlator itself which is a problem 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The chosen solution  is based on the observation that in a real-world  setting 
the IDS is most often connected to a point in an IP network where it can observe 
  
 
 
all traffic entering or leaving that network.  Therefore  while one out of the source 
and  destination addresses  of a packet  may  be any  of 232    possible  IP  address 
values, the other side will be set to one of the addresses on the monitored network 
which will be a small subset of that address space. Traffic not conforming to these 
rules  is taking place outside  of the range  of communications systems that the 
underlying  IDS is placed to observe. Similarly,  IP services tend to listen on well 
known ports, typically those under  1024. 
Two randomization methods  are chosen, one based on a class C IP network 
and  the other on  a  class  B network.  These  types of networks  are  defined  as 
having 28   and 216   addresses  each. The algorithm for generating the data is: 
 
1.  Pick a totally random  IP address  and port number. 
2.  Pick a random  IP address  within the allowable range of our network  class. 
3.  Pick a random  10 bit port number. 
4.  Toss a coin, if heads then the fully random  IP is the source address,  else it’s 
the destination address. 
5.  Toss another coin, if heads then the fully random  port number  is the source 
address,  else vice versa. 
 
Five  versions  of the random  data-set are created for each type of network, 
making  ten data sets in total. Each of the four variations of the algorithm were 
run  on each of the 10 data-sets  making  40 runs  in total. Each  run  is repeated 
three times and  the mean  CPU  time taken as the final result. The  variation in 
run time on the program  on the same data-set turned out extremely low so, for 
the sake  of concision,  the individual  run-timings are  not presented  here.  The 
885 real  alerts from the LLDOS  labeling  data are  interspersed randomly,  but 
correctly  ordered,  within each dataset. 
 
 
Table 1. CPU  Times  for Class B and  Class C Respectively. 
 
Class Exp. Min.  (s) Max.  (s) Mean  (s) Mean Rate  (a/s) 
 
B 
1(a) 
1(b) 
2(a) 
2(b) 
7.47667 
5.31 
6.55333 
6.45333 
9.21 
6.26333 
6.67667 
6.48 
7.905 
5.675 
6.599 
6.461 
126,502 
176,221 
151,541 
154,772 
 
C 
1(a) 
1(b) 
2(a) 
2(b) 
7.0533 
6.79667 
11.46 
10.9067 
7.14667 
6.87 
11.6033 
19.9233 
7.088 
6.818 
11.52 
12.43 
141,088 
146,675 
86.380 
80,440 
 
 
 
If we look at the final column of table 1 we can observe that the correlation 
rate is on the order  of 100,000 alerts per second. This  seems likely to be much 
faster than an IDS, certainly the majority of deployments in any case. 
In table  2 the columns  stand for the total number  of vertices  and  edges in 
the output C G respectively.  The  number  of false alerts  seems rather alarming 
 
 
 
Table 2. Output size for Class B and  Class C Respectively. 
 
Exp. Hyper-Alerts Correlations Hyper-Alerts Correlations 
 Class B Class C 
1(a) 194,817 157,734 346,782 888,262 
1(b) 182,727 148,457 129,220 641,115 
2(a) 376,786 401,974 190,986 691,809 
2(b) 299,395 302,553 190,417 691,112 
 
 
 
considering  only 885 of them are part of our scenario.  Although,  bear  in mind 
that our  noise  is distributed over  only  20 alert types which  are  quite highly 
connected.  Further we have opted  to restrict  alert values  to “realistic”  ranges. 
In practice  a million alerts do not occur over a few seconds but  perhaps  days or 
weeks. 
 
 
6.2 Quality  of Output 
 
The  aim  of this experiment is to take the same  totally accurate data-set and 
remove  random  alerts  and  test the accuracy  of hypothesizing  by how accurate 
the the graphs  are as an increasing  number  of alerts are missed. Unfortunately 
the number of ways of doing this with a data-set of of 855 alerts, such as ours, is 
astronomical and our sample sizes would have to be inappropriately large to gain 
results which can be interpreted with any confidence. From experience the algo- 
rithm is extremely robust either when all alerts of one or two types are removed 
or scores of alerts removed randomly.  This  intuition  leads us on to an alterna- 
tive experimental setup.  There  are only four types of alerts in the experimental 
data set.  At least two types are required  for there to be correlations and  if all 
alerts are present then the output is ideal. We shall experiment with removing 
all 2 and 3 combinations of alert types and examining  the false correlation rates 
which are calculated by hand  in this case. 
These experiments are run with Algorithm 2(b) only. To calculate false alert 
rates the output graphs  are  compared  against the complete  correlation graph 
which  contains  58 hyper-alerts.  A false negative  is counted  for every  alert in 
the complete  C G  for which  no  hypothesis  exists.  Conversely  a  false positive 
is counted  for every hypothesis  which does not correspond  to a hyper-alert  in 
the complete  C G.  For  labeling  purposes  alert types  are  named  A,  B,  C  and 
D, standing for ping-sweep, sadmind-ping,  sadmind-exploit  and mstream-zombie 
respectively. 
The  results  in table  3 are  difficult  to analyze  without  taking  a closer look 
at the output graphs  produced.  For attack sequences which are short in length, 
missing alerts  can  have a drastic  effect on the false negative  correlation  rates. 
False  positive hypotheses are  a  slightly less serious  problem  and  in  this case 
would be entirely  eliminated  with  existing  audit-record  correlation  techniques, 
as proposed  in [15]. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Hypothesis Accuracy. 
 
Input  Types False  Negatives False  Positives 
ABD 3 12 
BCD 32 0 
ACD 26 0 
ABC 14 0 
AC 37 0 
BD 35 12 
CD 41 0 
BC 44 0 
AD 35 12 
AB 20 0 
 
 
 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this paper a real-time  correlation algorithm using hyper-alert type graphs was 
proposed.  Our  general  approach  was to reduce  the minimal  IAC problem  to a 
series of insertions to and  removals  from a balanced  binary  tree. We proceeded 
from there to approach  the extended (hypothesizing) problem by re-phrasing  the 
minimal  problem  such that we can recursively  input  hyper-alerts with unknown 
(or wild-card) attributes. It was shown that such algorithms are feasible provided 
a few conditions are met: 
 
–  The number  of comparable  facts in hyper-alerts is small. 
–  If hyper-alerts  are  to be hypothesized  then type-graphs  should  be chosen 
carefully in order to prevent a exponential explosion in time complexity. 
 
The  algorithm was implemented and  validated through a series of experi- 
ments which showed that a good implementation is suitable for real-time  corre- 
lation even in cases where the IDS alert rate is alarmingly  high. In these cases 
the size of the output graph  becomes the overriding  factor  in determining the 
practical utility of the algorithm. It was also confirmed  that picking  the right 
aggregation function  is invaluable  in this respect  by allowing many hyper-alerts 
to be merged  in to a single logical unit.  However  it  is not immediately  clear 
how best to design these functions such as to minimize large output graphs  to a 
satisfactory degree. 
Although  our  approach  does not require  a vulnerability  assessment  it  has 
been  shown  that it  is possible  to make  use  of such  information  if it  is there 
[15]. It appears  that our algorithm could be modified for similar purposes.  The 
basic approach  here would be to incorporate  special constraints  which depend 
on external evidence sources. These  would be checked before correlating or hy- 
pothesizing an alert. However this leads to question of how to determine when 
to ignore  false negative vulnerability assessments if a successful attack of the 
relevant type has been observed? This may also be a fruitful direction  for inves- 
tigation. 
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